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ABSTRACT
Professor Bryant’s article—which seeks to discover whether aspects 
of an anticruelty statute can be based directly on a call to virtuous 
conduct—is a provocative piece of scholarship that harbors a much 
larger question: Can a general principle mandating full respect for 
animals be developed out of the moral methodology inhering in virtue 
ethics? Insights garnered in this rejoinder are meant to stand along-
side those in Professor Bryant’s article to lend deep moral grounding 
to animal-respect as well as provide intimations of the way virtue 
ethics as a moral methodology might yield determinate answers to 
moral questions.
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Professor Bryant’s article—which seeks to discover whether 
aspects of an anticruelty statute can be based directly on a call 
to virtuous conduct—is a provocative piece of scholarship that 
harbors a much larger question: Can a general principle man-
dating full respect for animals be developed out of the moral 
methodology inhering in virtue ethics? If Professor Bryant’s 
question is circumscribed, her efforts are nonetheless ambi-
tious, as both the issue of the moral grounding for animal-
respect and her methodology, virtue ethics, are surrounded 
by controversy and skepticism. Professor Bryant’s article is a 
thoughtful attempt to bring a controversial and evolving moral 
methodology to bear on a position the moral necessity of which 
is itself in dispute. 
My remarks in this rejoinder venture a bit further and haz-
ard to peek through the door that Professor Bryant has boldly 
opened and enticingly left ajar. I ask whether there might be 
some way in which virtue ethics—as opposed to other moral 
methodologies—is particularly suited to provide metes and 
bounds to the normative foundations of animal-respect. In-
sights garnered here are meant to stand alongside those in Pro-
fessor Bryant’s article to lend deep moral grounding to animal-
respect as well as provide intimations of the way virtue ethics 
as a moral methodology might yield determinate answers to 
moral questions. Toward this end, this paper has several sec-
tions. The first section briefly outlines virtue ethics as a moral 
methodology with particular attention to its highly situated and 
somewhat ad hoc aspect. The second section explores efforts 
over the last several decades to rely first on utilitarianism and 
then on deontological (or Kantian) approaches in pursuit of 
moral grounding for animal respect. The third section explores 
the particular challenges that utilitarianism or deontology must 
confront in attempting to provide moral grounding for any re-
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lationship between human beings and persons or creatures that 
are incapable of moral agency. Finally, I turn to the concept of 
fiduciary duty to see if it might be viewed as a type of virtue 
ethics—or perhaps an instance of virtue ethics in play. 
Before we begin, however, we want to note that ethical 
thinking has commonly recognized an indirect duty to animals, 
one that (in particular) proscribes the gratuitous infliction of 
suffering. The rationale for this injunction has been that, where 
human beings are concerned, cruelty to animals can foster cru-
elty to other humans. Modern efforts to construct a moral re-
quirement of animal-respect stand in marked contrast to these 
earlier positions as more recent scholars seek to establish that 
animals have intrinsic moral value and, accordingly, the duty to 
treat them with commensurate respect is direct.
I. Virtue ethics
Virtue ethics as an approach to moral life is at least as old 
as Aristotle. In recent years, however, this moral methodology 
has seen a revival, albeit in a more contemporary guise. In its 
most recent formulation, virtue ethics jettisons historic founda-
tions in Greek metaphysics in favor of “ethical naturalism,” a 
grounding more consonant with contemporary ideas about the 
nature of things. Modern day virtue ethics would retain from 
the classical formulation the concepts of phronesis—practical 
wisdom—and eudaimonia—the deep happiness of which the 
fully realized person is capable—without grounding these con-
cepts in aspects of Aristotelianism that are highly teleological 
and infused with dynamic necessity. Accordingly, ethical natu-
ralism is simply “the enterprise of basing ethics in some way on 
considerations of human nature, on what is involved in being 
good qua human being” (Hursthouse 1999, 192). Modern vir-
tue ethics is then a type of ethical naturalism that uses practical 
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wisdom to unearth those core moral precepts that make refer-
ence to and are embedded in the lives of humans as rational and 
social beings, when they are at their best as such (Hursthouse 
1999, 29).  
Virtue ethics as a moral methodology gives rise to a num-
ber of objections, however. One complaint is that any moral 
method that would place the virtuous agent at the center of an 
inquiry into virtue boils down to little more than a truism such 
that, for any given circumstance, “virtue is what the virtuous 
do,” or “virtue is virtue.”  The response to this objection is that, 
as a method, virtue ethics quickly moves to drill down on situ-
ated moral questions, to ask what a virtuous agent would char-
acteristically do under particular circumstances. The focus is 
on moral life in the trenches and in particular on those character 
traits that predispose this person to act in moral way. Once the 
inquiry is situated (so the claim is made), fundamental prin-
ciples become more determinate and indeed less tautological 
(Hursthouse 1999, 31).  But the claim that this moral method-
ology is typically highly situated in its application gives rise 
to a second objection – that, where principles are developed 
“in the trenches,” they are unlikely to offer much guidance be-
yond the narrow circumstances out of which they arise. And 
perhaps even more salient is the observation that, narrow or 
otherwise, if the resultant prescriptions take their moral force 
from the value of virtue per se, what about the person who has 
little truck with virtue?  It is hard to see what sort of claim vir-
tue ethics might make upon the conscience of the un-virtuous 
(Hursthouse 1999, 30).  (And this is particularly the case once 
the teleological dimensions of Aristotelianism are jettisoned.) 
Finally, whereas ethical theories typically focus on those things 
that are morally necessary, virtue ethics conflates (or perhaps 
even supplants) the necessary with the superogatory, the can-
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ons of ordinary decency with the heroic. No line can be drawn 
between what is morally required and those things that are 
above and beyond (Hursthouse 1999, 40).  The conflation of 
the necessary with the superogatory compounds the problem 
(inherent in most moral methodologies) of setting priorities 
among competing obligations.
Such objections notwithstanding, proponents of virtue ethics 
persevere with the stringent point that, however virtue ethics 
may fall short in developing universal requirements of moral-
ity, it offers something else which other moral methods do not, 
something which is a sine qua non of any moral method. Any 
method that aims only to produce a determinate and coherent 
set of moral requirements is unlikely to succeed as a moral 
method because, to shed light on or to develop moral precepts, 
a method must engender a particular attitude, not just concern-
ing the moral life, but also concerning the moral method as 
part of the moral life. What is required for any moral method to 
come into its own as an avenue into the moral is a concern more 
with “what kind of person do I want to be?” than “what are the 
duties or rules with which I must comply?” 1 (Hursthouse 1999, 
29). To succeed, a moral method must engender not merely a 
certain moral behavior, but also (and also more fundamentally) 
a way of thinking about moral discourse. Absent a cultivated 
attitude with respect to the “process,” any moral method (in its 
passive form) reduces to a posture of rule-compliance or (in 
a more active form) degenerates into casuistry. Either mind-
numbing concern with rules or shallow casuistry will thwart 
the moral method that is the midwife to the moral life. Unlike 
most schools of ethics, virtue ethics takes the spotlight off the 
letter of the law and focuses instead on the spirit. Rather than 
simply training the individual in rule compliance, virtue ethics 
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as a moral method develops in the individual an ever increas-
ing capacity for virtuous behavior which (among other things) 
moves the discourse to the right place (Hursthouse 1999, 27).  
Professor Bryant does not overlook that aspect of virtue eth-
ics that recognizes correct moral attitude as an essential pre-
requisite to moral discourse. But as she attempts to use virtue 
ethics as a framework within which to address animal cruelty 
in the egg production industry, she must also concede many 
of the objections outlined above, whatever the attitude brought 
to bear upon the process2 (Hursthouse 1999, 40-41). Even if 
virtue ethics makes for more productive moral discourse, this 
method would still appear to fall short when it comes to devel-
oping determinate principles to guide behavior – at least when 
it comes to relations between the species. Bryant maintains that 
virtue ethics does not directly yield or justify a general anti-
cruelty statute. But even when the method is applied to more 
situated dilemmas, such as that presented by the egg production 
industry, she finds it tough going. For example, California law 
requires depositaries of living animals to treat these animals 
“kindly” (Cal. Civil Code 2012).  While such a requirement 
can be seen as consonant with and perhaps derivative of virtue 
ethics, the statute provides no guidance as to the meaning of the 
word “kind” or particular actions that would accordingly be re-
quired (or proscribed) with respect to the animals. To the extent 
that this statute bespeaks “what is involved in being good qua 
human being,” it is hard to extract from this principle particu-
lar obligations applicable to the egg production industry. Thus, 
even where virtue ethics is applied as a highly situated meth-
2 Virtue ethics maintains that, to interpret rules and indeed to apply them 
in a particular case, a certain amount of virtue and corresponding practical 
wisdom (phronesis) are required. Over time the virtuous person develops a 
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odology, any resulting guidance with respect to the moral life 
seems to hover above the situation, remaining indeterminate. 
But further, a need to “be kind” offers nothing in the way of 
help in juggling competing moral obligations. What if an egg 
producer knowing the degree to which chickens suffer in this 
industry has a family that relies upon him for financial support? 
He then confronts a conflict the needs of his family and the 
needs of the chickens. Steps taken to minimize the suffering of 
the chickens potentially cut into his profits as a producer – an 
outcome with a particular moral force when these profits are 
instrumental in meeting obligations to a family by making a 
living. 
II. Alternatives
Virtue ethics as a moral methodology was born of an in-
creasing dissatisfaction with the dominant schools of modern 
ethics, especially utilitarianism and deontology, both types of 
liberalism (Hursthouse 1999, 2). Nevertheless, given the appar-
ent limitations of virtue ethics, not the least of which becomes 
evident in trying to generate substantive rules requiring animal 
respect, this is an occasion to revisit these other moral methods, 
with particular attention to the various attempts in the last 25 
years to use them to lend a more rigorous moral grounding to 
the relationship between humans and other animals. 
Recent attempts to provide a systematic argument for the 
idea that animals are entitled to respect comparable to that 
owed human beings have issued both from the utilitarians and 
from deontological theorists. Both of these approaches attempt 
to extend the obligation owed by humans to other animals well 
beyond animal welfare and compassion in its usual form. And, 
of course, both of these approaches draw upon of schools of 
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moral philosophy developed for the purpose of working out the 
ethical requirements of human-to-human existence. In both in-
stances, the goal has been in applying these foundations to the 
relations between animals and people, to subsume animals into 
the moral framework so that humans must show them concern 
and respect on a par with other humans. 
As we shall see, each of these two schools confronts a simi-
lar problem as it attempts to extend its fundamental premises 
to animals. While each school has a qualitatively different ap-
proach to moral justification, the moral principles emanating 
from either school remain indeterminate with respect to the 
bulk of those substantive rules necessary to collective life. The 
need to “gap-fill” presents a challenge where human-to-human 
relations are concerned, but for humans the challenge is not 
insurmountable. It is the stuff of moral and political discourse 
(framed, as per either school of thought, by fundamental prin-
ciples). Where other animals enter into the mix, however, the 
process of gap-filling presents virtually insurmountable hur-
dles. 
II.A Utilitarianism 
Of these two schools of thought, it is probably easier to de-
velop a position that animals deserve respect on a par with hu-
man beings out of utilitarianism. This is because, at least for 
the classical utilitarians, the only significant data of moral life 
are pleasures and pains. The test of whether an act is moral 
consists in assessing whether it makes for the greatest happi-
ness of the greatest number—whether its consequences, when 
all the pain and pleasure the act causes has been calculated, 
produce the greatest aggregate of well-being or happiness for 
all those who can experience pleasure or pain, as compared to 
any other course of action (Bentham 1789, ch. 4).  A direct 
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duty to animals is easily developed here because, if the most 
important data of human life are pleasures and pains and if we 
acknowledge that animals (like humans) are sentient creatures, 
then no utilitarian can doubt that indicia of animal sentience 
merit inclusion in any calculation of aggregate happiness (Ben-
tham 1789, n. 311).  
Even if the community of moral relevance can be enlarged 
so that animal sentience can be readily factored into the utilitar-
ian moral calculus, however, fundamental objections to utili-
tarianism as a moral philosophy operate to undercut the force 
and significance of such assimilation. While utilitarianism pur-
ports to give us a rule of behavior, a guide to action, it forces 
us to calculate, calculate calculate (Smart and Williams 1973, 
100-107).  Second, on a related point, in practice the metrics 
are impossible. The data relevant to any moral decision is likely 
to make for ambiguous and indeterminate conclusions (Smart 
and Williams 1973, 93-100).  Third and most importantly, there 
is nothing in the doctrine about the distribution of burdens. As 
long as pleasure is increased overall, it is of no moral moment 
that some people (or animals) suffer or even die as instrumen-
talities of the benefiting majority. All that need be secured is the 
optimal balance of pleasure over pain. So, for example, we can 
easily justify animal-testing on a certain number of animals, 
however cruel the test, if this type of activity can be shown to 
be important to advance the treatment of some disease affecting 
a majority of humans and other animals (Franklin 2005, 8-9; 
Singer 2009; Regan 2004, 202-205).  
II.B Deontology 
In the second school of thought, the deontological, we have a 
group of philosophers (most quintessentially, Kant (1785)) who 
focus on the concept of the moral itself, developing a rule (the 
Iris J. Goodwin
151
© Between the Species, 2013
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 16, Issue 1
“categorical imperative” in the case of Kant) and attendant du-
ties that go to the essence of this concept—as a sine qua non of 
moral relations (Pufendorf 1691; Finnis 1980). The challenge 
for those trying to develop a direct duty to animals from deon-
tological principles is, however, that deontological theories in 
general take moral duty to be part and parcel of some type of 
moral agency, aspects of free will and rationality that enable a 
human being to make right choices or to be responsible. It is the 
implication of this agency that makes for moral duty and pro-
vides at least minimal moral content to that duty (Kant 1785). 
However, for the foremost modern exponent of deontological 
ethics, Kant, moral obligations and moral rights run only to 
moral agents, or those with this essential capacity. Because ani-
mals lack this type of autonomy, they are merely moral patients 
and moral agents have no direct duty to them. 
More recently, deontologists pursuing a direct duty to ani-
mals have shifted the grounding of the concept of the moral 
away from moral agency to center on a universal vulnerability, 
that is, to the quality of being a moral patient. Animals can-
not be moral agents because they cannot be held responsible 
for following rules, but they can instead factor into the moral 
universe as “moral patients” because they can suffer unjustified 
harm from moral agents. For example, Tom Regan, perhaps the 
most prominent contemporary scholar to attempt to develop a 
direct duty to animals from a deontological foundation, takes 
as fundamental the capacity for sentience—the basic datum of 
moral life in utilitarian thinking. But rather than treating sen-
tience as merely a source of morally relevant data, Regan shifts 
the ground so that sentience entails vulnerability. Such vulner-
ability (or subjectivity) becomes the rationale for claiming that 
every sentient being is inherently valuable (Regan 2004, 279-
280; Franklin 2005, 16-20).  Claiming we have “a direct prima 
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facie duty not to harm individuals,” Regan moves to extend this 
“harm principle” to include animals, maintaining that all mam-
mals of one year or more in age have “inherent value” (Frank-
lin 2005, 20; Francione 2000, 18).  Any life—human being or 
other animal—is inevitably finite; once it is over it is infinitely 
gone. In that sense all sentient lives have an inherent value and 
animals are bearers of equal rights as are people. Thus, in Re-
gan’s hands this universality of sentience—this vulnerability—
becomes the basis of a theory of rights that runs to animals and 
to people alike.
When deontological principles are developed in such as way 
as they can be applied to the relations not only between humans 
but also between humans and animals, these rules support a 
fairly convincing argument against meat-eating and the grosser 
forms of animal abuse. To the extent animals can suffer harm 
(including the harm of a shortened life, however painless the 
death), they cannot be eaten any more than people can. As a 
tool with which to develop the metes and bounds of a direct 
duty to animals, however, deontological accounts fall short (as 
they do where duties to humans are concerned) in yielding sub-
stantive rules to govern myriad situations.
 III. Deliberation and Negotiation 
It is commonly observed that deontological ethics under-
stood as a moral method can be hard pressed to supply rules 
sufficiently determinate to govern the full panoply of situations 
that spring up in the course of interaction—whether it be hu-
man-to-human or, more recently, human-to-animal. But where 
human interactions are concerned, the characteristic means of 
rendering formal principles more substantive—negotiations be-
tween parties against the background of fair principles—serves 
to highlight the essential challenge of using a deontological 
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method to develop a direct duty to animals. Indeed, aspects of 
the theory of John Rawls (who resists the idea of a direct duty 
to animals) are particularly instructive in this regard. 
Rawls’s work is particularly illustrative because for him 
moral life at every stage presupposes the capacity for delibera-
tion. Unlike Kant, Rawls does not develop his basic premises 
governing human-to-human interactions on free will and ratio-
nality as such. Nor is he interested in according sentience some 
constitutive role in a theory of justice. Instead, he begins with 
the idea of community as the bedrock of the moral. Terms of 
social cooperation are then those that would emerge from an 
ideal situation structured to produce reasonable and impartial 
deliberation about the basic principles that are to govern soci-
ety as a system of fair cooperation. Those in this “original posi-
tion” are behind a “veil of ignorance” and know nothing about 
their circumstances otherwise. They know nothing about their 
class position or social status, their intelligence, talents or abili-
ties, not even their personal psychology or fundamental values. 
Operating from the same standpoint, all the parties are able to 
be similarly rational in their deliberations. 
Some suggest that the Rawlsian thought experiment could 
be expanded to include animals so that the duties that emerge 
behind the veil of ignorance would be owed also to animals. 
To do this, species would be suppressed behind the veil of ig-
norance along with other aspects of deliberators’ real circum-
stances. 
The introduction of animal interests into the original posi-
tion would, however, violate fundamental premises of Rawls’s 
construction. The point of Rawls’s thought experiment is to 
shine the light of reason on various attributes that typically 
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make for social advantage or disadvantage and (among other 
things) determine the weight of those attributes in a fair system 
of cooperation. While it might seem that it would not thwart the 
experiment to introduce into it the possibility that some mem-
bers of society will be moral patients (without a capacity for 
moral agency), Rawls’s heuristic artifice is meant to bespeak 
the capacity for reasoned judgment inherent in members of a 
well-ordered polity. So, while the participants function in some 
sense in a representative capacity, the device does not counte-
nance paternalism (Rawls 1993, 48-54 110-115).  
Rawls illustrates the pervasiveness of deliberation in moral 
life when he turns to the need in any well-ordered polity for 
something like a “just savings principle.” A polity needs to im-
pose taxes to develop and maintain various types of infrastruc-
ture (human capacities as well as material structures) necessary 
to secure the future of the polity. Rawls admits that precisely 
how these burdens are to be shared admits of no definite an-
swer. While elements of Rawls foundational principles impose 
ethical constraints on the distribution of these burdens, “[t]he 
principles of justice set up a certain range within which the rate 
of savings or the emphasis given to self-respect should lie. But 
they do not say where in this range the choice should fall.” Ul-
timately, Rawls concedes, “[w]e must rely on the actual course 
of discussion at the legislative stage to select a policy within the 
allowed bounds” (Rawls 1971, 284-293).
Because all deontological methods must extract from or de-
velop against the background of fundamental duties rules suffi-
ciently substantive to govern myriad social interactions, to cast 
moral patients in a constitutive role alongside moral agents be-
comes deeply problematic. The ability to act by understanding 
rules and making agreements is a sine qua non in the realiza-
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tion of a just social order. And, as Rawls’s theory underscores, 
where the capacity for deliberation is key, a presumption of 
reciprocity operates as a bedrock. 
As for utilitarianism, even if we can expand the community 
of moral relevance to include animals and other moral patients, 
utilitarianism also comes up short when it must generate the 
myriad substantive rules necessary to a mature polity. At that 
point utilitarianism also has to allow moral agents to fill gaps 
by devising consensual arrangements against a background of 
fundamental principles. Indeed, whether at issue are singular 
acts of individuals (as with act utilitarianism) or rules meant 
to govern a polity (as with rule utilitarianism), the injunction 
to embrace that which will produce the greatest aggregate of 
happiness entails complex calculations and readily disputed 
outcomes. And while more substantive rules potentially issue 
from disciplines that are the progeny of utilitarianism—micro-
economics and rational choice theory, both of these disciplines 
take as indicators of the relevant utility calculus the trade-offs 
made in the quid-pro-quo of the market. Thus, even if utilitari-
anism per se can include animals in the community of moral 
relevance, to the extent that utilitarianism relies upon market 
behavior as revelatory of aggregate utility, it is difficult to envi-
sion how the data of animal sentience are to factor in. 
IV. Moral Agent as Fiduciary:  Back to Virtue?  
It is hardly a new insight that utilitarianism and deontology 
as species of liberalism have trouble establishing the moral 
metes and bounds of relationships between parties that are 
not equal (Gilligan 1993, 173-174). The more fundamental 
problem in these ethical schools—that of finding philosophic 
footing for the rightful interests of the moral patient—can also 
come as no surprise. And, of course, not only do these moral 
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methods slight the interests of animals, but human beings of 
diminished capacity are also overlooked. Thus, by the same 
token that animals are side-lined, so are very young children, 
the mentally disabled and undeveloped (fetal) humans, among 
others (Franklin, 2005, 55).  
So the challenge to lend deep moral grounding to animal re-
spect persists. In the face of the limitations of utilitarianism and 
deontology, however, are we certain that the concept of virtue 
can take us no further? Even if virtue ethics falls short as an ef-
fort to extract a modern moral methodology from the concept 
of virtue, the concept of virtue itself is still alive and well and 
indeed turns up in various (non-deontological, non-utilitarian) 
methods and indeed in legal doctrines, all directed at securing 
the interests of moral patients. No one can claim that concept 
of virtue flowers in these places and unto itself gives rise to a 
moral method. It does, however, serve to ground other methods 
and strategies that for various reasons can be more determinate 
in their outcomes. Two examples follow.
IV.A Ethical Spheres and Virtue 
Christopher Stone as an environmentalist is eager to secure 
the interests of moral patients, a category he enlarges substan-
tially to include not only animals and humans of diminished ca-
pacity, but also future generations, plants and all manner of flo-
ra and fauna, trees, rivers, landscapes, vistas, and the list goes 
on (Stone 1987, 20-21).  In his classic Earth and Other Ethics, 
he maintains that these morally marginalized people and things 
are worthy of concern, but historically they have not made their 
way into the heart and soul of ethics (Stone 1987, 20).  And this 
is the case, he argues, even in the face of past efforts (of which 
deontology and utilitarianism could be seen as of a piece) to 
squeeze moral patients into familiar paradigms by indulging in 
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legal fictions, effectively ascribing to them moral agency, but 
then constructing limited exceptions to general rules in recogni-
tion of their significant differences (Stone 1987, 22).  Notwith-
standing these strategies, Stone maintains, any moral status the 
marginalized have been granted has been purely derivative of 
the welfare of those with moral agency (Stone 1987, 25).  
Along these same lines, Stone also sees as problematic the 
tendency to characterize any fundamental moral endowment 
ascribed to the otherwise marginalized as a right that can be 
trumped only if the holder waives or trades it (Stone 1987, 
147).   For persons or things incapable of unambiguously ar-
ticulating volitional intensions, to accord them rights (in any 
sense that the term is conventionally understood) is almost cer-
tain to freeze the ordering of collective priorities (Stone 1987, 
51).  Once assigned, such an entitlement will not be reallocable 
to the highest use by ordinary legal and market mechanisms 
and, accordingly, will be untenable as a freeze on aspects of the 
status quo (Stone 1987, 53).  
Stone maintains that both of these approaches—either rely-
ing on legal fictions or ascribing to the morally marginalized 
rights upon which they cannot act—jeopardize any attempt to 
develop a disciplined and coherent regime that will treat the 
historically marginalized with moral seriousness. His goal is to 
ascribe to these other persons and things what he terms “moral 
considerateness”—a more comprehensive and flexible alterna-
tive based more on the duties of moral agents than the rights on 
moral patients (Stone 1987, 55).  
The content of this “considerateness,” as Stone applies it 
to various moral patients, is to be undergirded with a plural-
ist moral methodology. The view that every quandary has to 
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be defined and attacked according to a single coherent set of 
rules must be surrendered. Stone resists the idea that the moral 
fabric that connects moral agents and moral patients is part and 
parcel of the governance that embroiders relations between 
and among moral patients themselves (Stone 1987, 147). The 
essential fact is that moral agents have differential access to 
information as they cross domains. Expectations appropriately 
change as agents move from friends to strangers or to animals 
because knowledge changes (Stone 1987, 142). To secure the 
moral status of the otherwise marginalized, ethics must be 
partitioned into several strata, or planes (Stone 1987, 153). A 
particular plane is an intellectual framework that, among other 
things, confronts our limited knowledge as to the preferences 
and, at times, even the needs of those patients that belong to the 
strata in question (Stone 1987, 133).   
Interestingly, however, as Stone insists that pluralism need 
not degenerate into rank relativism, he quickly reaches for the 
concept of virtue as a ground for his moral method (Stone 1987, 
246).  While Stone deflects attention away from patients’ rights 
to emphasize agents’ duties, it becomes clear that the edifice 
he is erecting will is the final analysis predicated upon agents’ 
moral virtue. In fact, Stone concedes that, when monist meth-
ods (whatever the stripe) are jettisoned in favor of pluralism, 
idealism of some sort—a desire to advance some good—com-
monly comes to inform the moral method. This point is per-
haps most easily grasped by thinking about how contemporary 
moral agents might apply the concept of moral considerateness 
to future generations of moral agents (the not-yet-existent be-
ing in this era the moral patients of the contemporary). There is 
no way, Stone observes, to arrive at what the progeny will want 
independent of what the current generation wants them to want. 
Thus, there is no way for the current generation of moral agents 
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to treat future generations with moral considerateness except 
by trying to advance some good (Stone 1987, 88). “There is 
no way we can carry out a commitment to care for our distant 
progeny and avoid the question of what things we want them to 
value and disvalue” (Stone 1987, 89).  The insight that idealism 
and indeed human virtue are inescapably in play when we seek 
to care for those who cannot speak for themselves enters into 
Stone’s argument in other places as well (Stone 1987, 184).  As 
he waxes lyrical toward the end of his treatise, Stone says with 
respect to any ethical plane, “It is by the choices we affirm in 
this zone, no less than by our yielding to the dictates of a clear 
moral command, that we have our highest opportunity to exer-
cise our freedom and define our character” (Stone 1987, 254)  
IV.B A Punctilio of Honor
Finally, if liberalism (whatever the school) is generally re-
luctant to pursue ethical rules that would govern relations 
between unequals, the Western legal tradition, using the con-
cept of fiduciary duty, has long ago developed laws to gov-
ern such relationships (Stone 1987, 48). Indeed, drawing upon 
the concept of fiduciary duty, the law has long given quarter 
to moral patients. And if fiduciary duty has historically gov-
erned relationships between human beings, this rich area of the 
law nevertheless illustrates the possibility of doing what Stone 
suggests—generating rules within ethical planes or particular 
intellectual frameworks and doing so with discipline and intel-
lectual integrity (Stone 1987, 105). The concept of fiduciary 
duty demonstrates that it is possible to come to terms with rela-
tionships between unequals and to develop rules uniquely tai-
lored to a situation where one party is vulnerable relative to the 
other. Such rules would be calculated not only to discourage 
exploitation but also to foster the well-being of the party who, 
relatively speaking, has less aptitude. In this area of the law the 
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most basic rules—which address things like self-dealing—are 
clear in their proscriptions and impose draconian remedies. But 
most importantly, a significant portion of the law of fiduciary 
duty frames the exercise of discretion so that the fiduciary can 
respond to changing circumstances in ways that best serve the 
moral patient. Indeed it is this exercise of discretion with re-
spect to the interests of someone who is not a peer of the fidu-
ciary that is the essence of the fiduciary role; it is what makes 
it unique in the law.  
Perhaps because this exercise of discretion is so central to 
the fiduciary role, fiduciary law has at its core aspects of ide-
alism and indeed virtue. The concept of virtue provides the 
touchstone for the exercise of discretion and informs the laws 
governing it. As with virtue ethics, the spirit of the law neces-
sarily animates the letter. Indeed, for the errant fiduciary seek-
ing to refuge in the letter of the law, there is the famous ad-
monition by Justice Cardozo, “A trustee is held to something 
stricter than the morals of the marketplace. Not honesty alone, 
but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the stan-
dard of behavior” (Meinhard v. Salmon 1928). 
Most moral agents enter into a fiduciary relationship vol-
untarily, by means of a contract with another moral agent who 
effectively engages the fiduciary to see to the well-being of a 
third party. Because the third party will have less aptitude than 
the fiduciary in some important respect (perhaps in the way 
of financial acumen), the third party will be, relative to the fi-
duciary, a moral patient. Recently it has become possible to 
provide for the care of a pet via this classic trust arrangement 
(Frasch et al. 2011, 211-213).
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But moral agents can also find themselves deemed a fidu-
ciary without entering into such an agreement. It has long been 
the case that, where parties are not equal in some important 
respect (in particular where one party possess some esoteric 
knowledge—financial, medical, etc.) and where the vulner-
able party has reason to rely on the one with superior aptitude, 
the law can impute a fiduciary relationship, with attendant li-
ability imposed on the deemed fiduciary. This second situation 
suggests the versatility of the concept of the fiduciary as an 
intellectual framework—indeed a quite venerable intellectual 
framework—within which to develop rules appropriate to re-
lationships between moral agents and those moral patients of 
many stripes heretofore ignored by the law and much philoso-
phy (Frasch et al. 2011, 211-213; Sunstein 2004, 251). But fur-
ther, the imputation of fiduciary duty also suggests that, where 
there are unequals, moral agents can—under certain circum-
stances—have inherent responsibilities to moral patients. 
V. Conclusion
Professor Bryant’s attempt to predicate aspects of an anti-
cruelty statute on a call to virtuous conduct encounters difficul-
ties that are at one with the commonplace criticisms of modern 
virtue ethics as a moral method—that it cannot develop out of 
the impulse to do virtue the universal requirements of a virtu-
ous life or, where the impulse to virtue is various, set priori-
ties among intentions. Thus, when Professor Bryant tries to use 
virtue ethics to give shape and form to the moral requisites of 
the egg production industry, the resulting guidance is indeter-
minate.   
Before the call to virtue is entirely jettisoned as being of little 
use in developing a direct requirement of animal-respect, how-
ever, we must recall that virtue ethics as a moral methodology 
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has emerged in the face of dissatisfactions with the two domi-
nant schools of modern moral thinking—utilitarianism and de-
ontology.  Further, whatever the broader colloquy about these 
two schools, each of them confronts virtually insurmountable 
challenges in encompassing within its terms relationships be-
tween unequals. Indeed, as a problem that has long beset liberal 
thinking, this difficulty extends to the goal of developing a di-
rect duty to animals. 
Relationships between unequals are particularly problematic 
for these other methods due to the way they extract from or 
develop out of their fundamental premises those myriad sub-
stantive rules necessary in any era to guide humans through the 
panoply of situations that arise in the course of social interac-
tion—whether human to human or human to animal. Where 
interactions are human to human, however, these moral meth-
ods allow for various forms of voluntary dealings between or 
among parties to produce substantive rules. Depending on the 
school, either market behavior or deliberations against a back-
ground of fair principles of political engagement produce the 
necessary substantive prescriptions. As it works out, however, 
where one of the parties lacks the capacity to bargain or to de-
liberate, as the case may be, this essential process of gap-fill-
ing cannot proceed. In short, as exponents of these alternative 
schools attempt to extract from their fundamental premises the 
substantive necessities entailed by animal respect, the method-
ology runs aground. (Utilitarianism probably falters at a later 
point in the unfolding of its method, but both schools ultimately 
fall short.)  
But all is not lost with respect to the moral governance of re-
lationships between unequals—and much is still to be gleaned 
from the concept of virtue. While Professor Bryant’s project 
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raises serious doubts as to whether virtue ethics can flower into 
a comprehensive moral methodology that can require or justify 
animal respect (among other things), the idea of virtue con-
tinues to appear in diverse places to significant effect, both in 
philosophical schemes (albeit in ones less monistic than typical 
iterations of utilitarianism or deontology) and in the law. And 
given the fundamental challenges that inhere in utilitarianism 
and deontology where relationships between unequals are con-
cerned, these appeals to virtue are worth noting. Perhaps most 
provocative in this regard is the venerable law of fiduciary duty, 
where dealings between unequals are the primary focus. The 
call to virtuous conduct occupies center stage as the antidote to 
a situation otherwise rife with exploitation. The “punctilio of 
an honor” becomes a necessary and indeed compelling touch 
point where moral agents do the inevitable—the morally un-
avoidable—and exercise discretion on behalf of moral patients. 
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